Why do welfare states persist by Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza
Why DoWelfare States Persist?
Clem Brooks Indiana University, Bloomington
Jeff Manza Northwestern University
The shape and aggregate output of welfare states within many developed democracies have been fairly resilient in the
face of profound shifts in their national settings, and with respect to the global environment of the past 20 years.This
contrasts with once-widespread predictions of universal retrenchment, and it has broadened debates over trends in
social policymaking to focus on the phenomenon of welfare state persistence. Research on persistence has not, to date,
directly considered the possibility that welfare states survive because of enduring popular support. Building from
recent welfare state theory and the emerging literature on policy responsiveness, we consider the possibility that mass
public opinion—citizens’ aggregate policy preferences—are a factor behind welfare state persistence. We analyze a
new country-level data set, controlling for established sources of welfare state development, and buttressing estimates
by testing for endogeneity with respect to policy preferences.We ﬁnd evidence that the temporal distribution of policy
preferences has contributed to persistence tendencies in a number of welfare states. We discuss results in conclusion,
suggesting the utility of further consideration of linkages between mass opinion and social policy in cross-national
perspective.
O
nce viewed as spiraling into steady decline,
welfare states within many developed democ-
racies now appear resilient in the face of dra-
matic shifts in their national settings and with respect
to the turbulent global environment of the past 20
years. In contrast to early declarations of the seeming
inevitabilityof retrenchment(e.g.,Brown1988;Mark-
lund 1988; Schwartz 1994), high levels of social ser-
vices and cash beneﬁts continue to deﬁne many West
European polities (Castles 2004; Iversen 2001; Swank
2002).In Scandinavia,despite important changes such
as a reindexing of a number of beneﬁts and eligibility
requirements in Sweden, the social democratic model
continues to set a standard for public generosity in the
OECD (Kautto et al. 2001; Lindbom 2001; Stephens
1996).
Welfare state analysts are acutely aware of eco-
nomic and political pressures on mature welfare
states that contribute to slower rates of growth or
cut-backs within speciﬁc policy domains (e.g.,
Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Hicks 1999; Huber
and Stephens 2001). But while the “golden age” of
postwar social policy expansion has for now drawn
to a close, the emerging consensus is that sweeping
declarations of retrenchment provide a limited basis
for understanding welfare state persistence in the con-
temporary historical era. Key to understanding social
policy trends is that domain-speciﬁc cuts have at
times been offset, sometimes even overshadowed,
by expansion or stability in other policies (Esping-
Andersen 1996; Pierson 2001; Stephens, Huber, and
Ray 1999).
1
Accounting for persistence tendencies in the
overall output or size of welfare states deﬁnes an
important new agenda for theory and research. What
are the causal mechanisms behind contemporary pat-
terns of persistence? This issue takes on particular sig-
niﬁcance in light of the possibility that the factors
1As powerfully documented in the work of Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Scruggs and Allan (2006), retrenchment trends have been most
apparent in policy domains relating to cash entitlements, particularly sickness and unemployment beneﬁts. These trends are important,
yet it would be premature to equate them with patterns of change in aggregate social policy output.Welfare state policymaking spans both
social services and cash beneﬁts, and the increasingly service-oriented character of welfare states has been noted by many analysts
(Esping-Andersen 1996; Huber and Stephens 2000; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Swank 2002). Rising public expenditure on
services constitute an important redirection (but not retrenchment) of social welfare. A focus on replacement income entitlements is
informative with respect to questions concerning cash beneﬁts,yet it provides an insufﬁcient basis with which to evaluate trends in overall
welfare state output or to reject scholarly consensus concerning retrenchment.
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816underlying contemporary welfare states differ from
those generating initial pressures.
2
The question we consider in this paper is whether
citizens’ attitudes toward social policy—mass policy
preferences, in our shorthand—help to account for
persistence tendencies within contemporary welfare
states.A number of scholars have anticipated the pos-
sibility that mass policy preferences have a buttressing
effect on many welfare states, and there is theoretical
reason to expect that citizens’ opposition to cuts in
social programs would be consequential. But to date,
no systematic empirical analysis has been developed
to test such a proposition. Our initial investigation
addresses several challenges. These include the possi-
bility that policy preferences are a proxy for another
mechanism of welfare state development, such as
partisan governance. Our analyses take into account
established welfare state factors (such as political insti-
tutions, demographic composition, and macroeco-
nomic factors) and globalization forces (measured by
foreign direct investment). We also assess the validity
of our results by testing for endogeneity in the inter-
relationship of policy preferences and welfare state
policy output.
Theoretical Perspectives on Welfare
State Persistence
Power Resources and Path Dependency
The theoretical perspectives developed by scholars
within the power resources and path dependency tra-
ditions have dominated debates over welfare state
trends. Recent work within both traditions clearly
anticipates a signiﬁcant role for policy preferences.
The causal focus of the power resources approach
(Hicks 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1989) is
on political parties and class-related factors. A key
proposition is that welfare state policies are a product
of legaciesof classandpartisaninﬂuence.Thishistori-
cal patterning is said to create ideal-typical welfare
regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2000), where institu-
tionalization of high levels of provision is most secure
in polities in which beneﬁts and services are distrib-
uted universally.Power resources scholars have argued
that legacies of partisan control over national govern-
ment generate inertia in countries’ approaches to
social policy (Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein 1998).
In Huber and Stephens’ formulation, welfare state
development creates a “policy ratchet” in which con-
servative parties accept new forms of social provision
because “those reforms were popular with the mass
public” (2001, 28–29).
Foritspart,pathdependencytheoriesassumethat
early social policy developments set nations on dis-
tinct trajectories that, once adopted, are difﬁcult to
reverse. Work within this theoretical tradition identi-
ﬁes two distinct types of causal mechanisms behind
path dependency. One of these is policy feedback,
where the establishment of new government policy
inﬂuences sources of welfare state support and the
strategies of actors seeking to shape policy (Hacker
2002; Heclo 1974; Skocpol 1995). Recent work by
Pierson(1996,2001)furtherhypothesizesthatthe“old
politics of welfare states” involving class conﬂict have
begun to be displaced. The contemporary stage of
welfarestatedevelopmentissaidtoreﬂecta“newpoli-
tics” characterized by novel constituencies as well as
different incentives for government ofﬁcials to expand
(or maintain) government beneﬁts and services. In
the new political environment of the welfare state, a
pattern of locking-in tends to develop as politicians
receive greater beneﬁts from “credit-claiming initia-
tives” than “blame avoidance” for spending cutbacks
(Pierson 1996).
Why Mass Policy Preferences?
Recent extensions of power resources and path-
dependency theorizing are broadly consistent with,
and perhaps even suggest,a causal role for mass policy
preferences as a mechanism behind persistence ten-
dencies in welfare states. In the power resources argu-
ment, the historical development of speciﬁc types of
welfare regimes is expected to inﬂuence the degree of
zero-sum conﬂict and the distribution of interests
among social groups (Korpi and Palme 1998; Roth-
stein 1998). This suggests that the persistence of gen-
erous welfare states is linked to robust preferences on
the part of working and middle-class citizens (and,
more generally, the population as a whole). Similarly,
the path dependency thesis (Pierson 1996, 2001) is
readily coupled with the proposition that the “asym-
metry” of beneﬁts versus costs for government ofﬁ-
cials to maintain rather than retrench welfare
spending and entitlements is shaped by the prior dis-
tribution of policy preferences on the part of voters.
Indeed, this proposition is perhaps most persuasive if
2In the words of Pierson:“On the growth of the welfare state,there
is a huge and sophisticated literature...T h i scannot be said of the
dynamics emerging in this new era. Indeed, a systematic program
of research has barely begun. Such a program is badly needed...
because there is good reason to believe that research on the‘golden
age’ of social policy will provide a rather poor guide to under-
standing the current period.” (2001, 2–3).
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preferences of voters exert pressure on politicians to
maintain social programs. A systematic analysis of
opinion impacts on welfare states may thus be infor-
mative.
The proposition that policy preferences shape
welfare state policies is,however,buttressed by impor-
tant new work on policy responsiveness within
democracies (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien
1995;cf.Burstein1998).Focusingonlinkagesbetween
mass opinion and public policy outputs, the policy
responsiveness literature advances a far-reaching
proposition: that government ofﬁcials have incentives
toincorporatepolicypreferencesintopolicymakingso
as to avoid voter sanctions in the form of electoral
defeat or public protests (Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002, chapter 7). This hypothesis could, of
course,failtoaccuratelydescribepolicymakinginspe-
ciﬁc national settings. But evidence to date offers a
notable degree of corroboration.
A signiﬁcant portion of this research has investi-
gated policy responsiveness in the United States,
ﬁnding evidence for linkages between mass opinion
and legislative or spending output across various
policy domains, and also with respect to executive
or legislative branches of government (Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and
Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; cf. Geer 1996). Further
evidencecomesfromworkonthesubnationaldomain
of state houses (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989;
Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; cf.
Johnson,Brace,andArceneaux 2005).Moving beyond
the United States,a number of innovative studies have
presented evidence for linkages between mass policy
preferences and government spending within Canada
(Petry 1999; Soroka and Wlezien 2005b), Germany
(Brooks 1990), and the United Kingdom (Soroka and
Wlezien 2005a). The empirical focus of this work has
generallybeenongovernmentspendingasawhole(or,
in the American case, aggregated legislative output)
and not on welfare state output per se (see Manza and
Cook 2002 for review). But the evidence presented by
these studies suggests the operation of public policy
responsiveness beyond the United States, and the
further likelihood that government ofﬁcials may also
respond to preferences concerning the welfare state.
Data and Methods
Analysis of welfare state persistence requires high-
quality data on welfare state policy output and mass
policy preferences in cross-national and historical per-
spective. Welfare state data should use standardized
deﬁnitions of social policy output. Data on mass
policy preferences should be based on items that
employ identical question wording and response
formats. The new data set we have assembled
addresses these requirements by merging together
data from the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development and the International Social
Survey Program, enabling analysis of 14 democracies
during the period from 1980 through 2000 (Interna-
tional Social Survey Program 1988, 1993, 1994, 1999,
2001; Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).
It is critical to employ a fully comparative cross-
nationaldesignthathasstandardizeddataformultiple
countries and time periods. Statistical analyses of
single countries (or comparisons using country-
speciﬁc data) are limited by the possibility that differ-
ences in levels (or effects) of variables are an artifact of
country-speciﬁc measures. Our investigation accord-
ingly draws upon standardized measures that are fully
comparable.
Measures of Overall Welfare Output
Our primary dependent variable measures the
aggregated output of welfare states. Policy-speciﬁc
provisions relating,for instance,to pensions or unem-
ployment beneﬁts are informative, yet past debates
over retrenchment have highlighted the importance of
considering the overall policy output of welfare states
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Lindbom 2001; Swank
2002). This is because it is the overall output and
expenditure of welfare systems that appear to be most
clearly characterized by persistence tendencies.Within
some countries, speciﬁc domains may suggest more
extensive patterns of decline, while others are charac-
terized by expansion trends or a pattern of stability.
3A
focus on domains experiencing spending cuts or
retrenchmentwouldthusyieldaselectiveportrait,one
that is insufﬁcient to use as a basis with which to
analyze persistence tendencies in contemporary
welfare states.
We use the ratio of government spending on
aggregated beneﬁts and services relative to gross
domestic product to measure the policy output of
3For instance, in the key cases of Sweden (e.g., Kautto et al. 2001;
Lindbom 2001) and the United States (e.g., Hacker 2002; Weaver
2000), programmatic changes in the 1990s to AFDC and unem-
ployment beneﬁts respectively represent signiﬁcant instances of
policyretrenchment,butonesthatprovideaninsufﬁcientbasisfor
observing trends in overall welfare output within these countries.
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were introduced in early studies (e.g., Pampel and
Williamson 1985; Wilensky 1975), and they remain
a staple of contemporary work (e.g., Swank 2002).
Effort-related measures have a further relevant prop-
erty:overall welfare state spending relative to GDP has
been found to predict patterns of inequality and
poverty within democracies (Brady 2003; Kenworthy
2004; Moller et al.2003).We emphasize that our focus
on overall welfare state output does not preclude
furtherconsiderationof thepossibleinﬂuenceof mass
policy preferences on domain-speciﬁc outputs and
entitlements (e.g., Allan and Scruggs 2004; Clayton
and Pontusson 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003). But an
analysis of overall welfare effort provides a useful
starting point for considering the phenomenon of
persistence and its possible linkage to mass policy
preferences.
Our measure of overall welfare state effort sum-
marizes 13 categories of cash beneﬁts and services
(see web site Appendix Table 3 at http://www.
journalofpolitics.org). This measure is from the Social
Expenditures Database (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2002), and it repre-
sentsthemostcomprehensivecurrentindexof welfare
spending (Castles 2004; Swank 2002). We use these
data to ﬁrst summarize trends in welfare effort for
speciﬁc countries; we combine countries according to
the standard typology (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990) to
generate results for liberal, Christian democratic, and
social democratic regime types.In our analyses,liberal
democracies are Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States;
Christian democracies are Austria, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, and Switzerland; and social
democracies are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden.
4 While the regime concept is not without
controversy (Arts and Gelissen 2002), the Esping-
Andersen typology continues to provide scholars with
a fruitful summary of welfare state differences, par-
ticularly as regards variation in the overall shape of
social policy output. Because this typology has been
central to research on welfare state trends and the
persistence scenario (Esping-Andersen 1996; Huber
and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001), it allows us to
situate our results in relation to those of previous
investigations.
Independent Variables
Our measure of policy preferences is extracted from
the International Social Survey Program’s Religion I
and II, and Role of Government I, II, and III surveys
(1988, 1993, 1994, 1999, and 2001). Care was taken by
ISSP principal investigators to ﬁeld survey questions
in a standardized way across countries. The two items
we use in the analyses have identical question wording
and response formats across surveys, asking about
respondents’ attitudes toward government responsi-
bility for providing employment and reducing income
inequality. These items scale with a high degree of
reliability (a = .92),
5 and we have merged policy pref-
erence scores for countries with the OECD data for
welfare state effort. The unit of analysis in the merged
data set is thus the country-year.
6
To consider the impact of policy preferences in
contributing to temporal persistence in welfare states,
we take into account established factors behind
welfare state development (for further information,
see web site Appendix Table 4). Past scholarship has
argued for the importance of a nation’s political insti-
tutions for understanding the historical development
of welfare states (e.g., Pierson 1994; Weir, Orloff, and
Skocpol 1988). Following recent work (Huber and
Stephens 2001; Swank 2002), we measure this factor
by the number of institutional “veto points” within a
polity, where a higher number of veto points is
expected to lower the likelihood of generous social
programs because it provides greater opportunity for
business organizations and their political allies to
block egalitarian initiatives.
A second set of independent variables captures
changes in the domestic environment of welfare states
(Esping-Andersen 1996; Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000).
We consider the economic factors of unemployment
and per capita GDP, as well as the percentage of the
aged population. Women’s labor force participation
has been established as a key gender-related source of
4Data is available for Japan, and while the Japanese welfare state
has occasionally been classiﬁed as a conservative/Christian demo-
cratic regime, the absence of a Christian democratic or successful
religious party in postwar Japan provides little basis for such a
classiﬁcation.Indeed,the limited use of universalistic entitlements
in Japan places it in closer proximity to the liberal democracies.In
theanalysesthatfollow,wedonotclassifyJapanasoneof thethree
ideal-typical welfare states, noting that its inclusion in the liberal-
democratic type yields indistinguishable results.
5These items are drawn from a larger battery of ISSP questions
about attitudes towards social policy.Initial analysis of this battery
revealed that the two items we use account for just over 50% of the
total variance; the eigenvalue for the second component dropped
considerably,providing evidence that the items we analyze capture
the common factor underlying the larger set of ISSP items.
6Surveys of speciﬁc countries for a given ISSP module were not
always ﬁelded in the same calendar year,so the coding of country-
years in the analyses reﬂects the actual survey date.
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To capture the insights of power resources theory, we
consider measures for the three major party families
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens
1993; Korpi 1989).The estimates we present below are
for left and religious parties, and we note inclusion of
the (small and nonsigniﬁcant) right party governance
variable has no effect on other coefﬁcients.
7 Our ﬁnal
variable captures pressures associated with economic
globalization. Here we focus on outﬂows of capital
(Alderson 1999; Firebaugh and Beck 1994) as a key
dimension of globalization,noting that parallel analy-
ses of a measure of capital inﬂows or a scale of inﬂow
and outﬂow data yield indistinguishable results.
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Methods
The data in this study are cross-sectional time-series
data, in which the unit of analysis is the country-year.
Cross-sectional time-series data can be characterized
by the presence of heteroskedastic or correlated errors,
violating classical assumptions regarding independent
and nonvarying errors (Greene 2000). Our data set,
like many other cross-section time-series data that are
generated by merging country-level summaries of
survey data with OECD data (Brady 2003; Bradley
et al. 2003), has a “wide” structure in which there are
more countries than time periods. We follow Moller
et al.’s approach (2003) in analyzing data of this sort,
employing a robust-cluster OLS model to address cor-
related and nonidentically distributed errors. The
robust-cluster approach provides corrected standard
errors in the presence of unequal variance among
errors or correlated within-unit errors. In the course
of the analysis, we also compared the robust-cluster
approach with random-effects and ﬁxed-effects esti-
mators. This analysis (see Brooks and Manza 2006)
favors the robust-cluster approach, using Raftery’s
Bayesian Information Criterion (1995; see also Beck
and Katz 2001) to compare models.
8
Wealsoconsideredthepossibilitythatmasspolicy
preferences are endogenous with respect to aggregated
welfare output.Results of those analyses are presented
in web site Appendix Table 1. Our application of the
Hausman speciﬁcation test (1978; Davidson and
MacKinnon 1993) provides evidence against endoge-
neity in mass policy preferences.To be sure,long-term
policy feedback processes in which welfare state devel-
opment eventually affects policy preferences (or other
right-hand side variables) may occur. But a key point
for these analyses is that the endogeneity test provides
evidence against simultaneous or short-term policy
feedback, where the latter could introduce bias into
our estimation of the contemporaneous inﬂuence of
mass policy preferences.
Results
Trends in Overall Welfare State Effort
We ﬁrst consider the nature of trends in aggregate
welfare state output within developed democracies.
This corroborates the consensus that there is no uni-
versal pattern of retrenchment when it comes to the
overall size of welfare states. Figure 1 presents three-
year moving averages for trends in overall welfare
spending effort within speciﬁc countries (the left-
hand panel) and regime types (the right-hand panel).
We present additional over-time data for all countries
in web site Appendix Figure 1.
Starting with the results for Sweden, welfare state
spending during the 1980s was stable at 30% of gross
domestic product, rising to approximately 36% by
1993, but quickly moving back towards earlier levels
bythelate1990s.Netof thiscyclicalvariation,Swedish
welfare state spending during the past two decades
shows little evidence of extensive decline, in keeping
with the conclusions of past studies (Kautto et al.
2001; Lindbom 2001; Stephens 1996). Parallel results
for all social democracies in Figure 1’s second panel
are also congruent with previous research (Andersen
et al. 1999; Nordlund 2000) and show a comparable
pattern of change in which increases in the late 1980s
were offset by cut-backs during the 1990s.
While the Scandinavian democracies had by far
thehighestoveralllevelof welfarespendingduringthe
1990s, the Christian democracies experienced a dra-
matic increase during the early part of the decade. As
shown in Figure 1’s data, this increase was largest in
Germany, but similar patterns of growth occurred
elsewhere in continental Western Europe (cf. Castles
2004; Iversen 2001; Swank 2002).The single exception
7We do not include a measure of union density in the analyses,but
given high levels of association between left party strength and
union density (Huber and Stephens 2001), the unmeasured inﬂu-
ence of the latter may be taken into account by the measures of
partisan control over government.
8The ﬁxed-effects approach is commonly applied to address
omitted variable bias and other nonrandom error structures in
(longitudinal) individual-level data, yet its limitations for analyz-
ing cross-section time-series data are generally severe. This is
because ﬁxed-effects requires a purely within-country analysis and
estimation, even though many country-level data sets are charac-
t e r i z e db yg r e a t e rbetween-country than within-country variance
(Plumper, Troeger, and Manow 2005).
820 clem brooks and jeff manzais the Netherlands, whose approximately 30% welfare
state effort during the early 1980s was more character-
istic of the social democratic regime type. Yet in the
1990s the Dutch welfare state experienced a pattern of
steady decline, yielding a net change of approximately
-4 percentage points.
Turning to the liberal democracies,Figure 1’s data
show a positive if smaller trend in welfare state effort,
where this increase occurred primarily during the late
1980s, declining slightly in the 1990s. The United
States experienced some variability, but with no evi-
dence of retrenchment trends by decade’s end. In
cross-national terms,the liberal democracies are char-
acterized by lower levels of social spending (cf. Huber
and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001), with a pattern of
modest growth during the early 1990s followed by
temporal persistence during the remainder of the
decade.
Analysis of Welfare State Persistence
We begin our analysis of welfare state persistence by
ﬁrst estimating a model of the merged OECD/ISSP
data,where the dependent variable is welfare spending
effort and right-hand side variables include the novel
factor of mass policy preferences. We then use coefﬁ-
cient estimates in conjunction with relevant sample
means to predict welfare state spending output under
different, theoretically relevant conditions. These
include trends in which all countries approach the
level of policy preferences represented by the United
States (holding constant other covariates at observed
levels). This allows us to simulate the effect of speciﬁc
temporal patterns of change on welfare state output.
Because it is well-known that mass support for welfare
states in many countries shows considerable stability,
or, in some cases growing support in recent decades
(Andersen et al. 1999; Smith 1987; Svallfors 1997),
simulations enable us to gauge evidence for the con-
tribution of these temporal patterns to welfare state
persistence. To be sure, such simulations carry with
them intrinsic uncertainty. We acknowledge this
uncertainty and emphasize that our application seeks
to incorporate criteria identiﬁed by scholars as central
to valid methodological applications.
9
9Simulations of this sort are gaining in application within the
social sciences (e.g., Alderson 1999; Dinardo and Lemieux 1997;
Kiser and Levi 1996), including among quantitative analysts.With
respect to our application (Hawthorne 1991; Tetlock and Belkin
1996), we incorporate the key methodological criteria of clarity
(specifying the variables under consideration); historical consis-
tency (maximizing plausibility by minimizing the number of
counterfactuals simultaneously considered); and statistical consis-
tency (developing inferences based on analysis of real data).
FIGURE 1 Trends in Welfare State Effort (3-year moving averages)
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with a number of other country-level variables a
degree of temporal stability in their distributions.
This characteristic does not disqualify these variables
as causal factors behind social policymaking. For
instance, political-institutional attributes exhibit
perfect temporal stability over the time period we con-
sider, and aged population composition shows a
pattern of considerable inertia. Yet both factors are
clearly inputs into social policy. Rather than explain-
ing change, then, relatively stable temporal patterns in
the level of policy preferences are expected to exert
pressures towards inertia and persistence in welfare
states.
In Table 1, we present coefﬁcients and standard
errors for our statistical model of welfare state effort.
Starting with Model 1, our primary model of interest,
most coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant and their signs are
generallyconsistentwithpastscholarship.Coefﬁcients
for economic and demographic factors represent large
effects. Even larger is the effect for mass policy prefer-
ences, with the negatively signed coefﬁcient for the
interaction term implying that this effect is smaller
within liberal democracies in comparison to other
polities.
10 The coefﬁcient for left party control over
government is small and not signiﬁcant, consistent
with studies ﬁnding smaller effects of left party
incumbency on overall welfare state output during
recent decades in comparison to earlier historical eras
(see Huber and Stephens 2001, chapter 6). In light of
the possibility that the cumulative pattern of left party
control may itself be associated with mass policy pref-
10This effect is consistent with institutionalist work on political
processes in liberal versus other welfare regimes (Pierson 1996,
2001; Rothstein 1998), and in the course of the analyses we tested
forotherinteractionsinvolvingpolicypreferences.Additionaltests
ﬁnd evidence restricted to the interaction with liberal democra-
cies, an informative consideration in light of the possibility that
social policy responsiveness varies across such other features of
national context as constitutional structure or electoral system
type (Huber and Stephens 2001; Manza and Cook 2002; Powell
2000).
TABLE 1 Statistical Models
a of Welfare State Effort (N = 32)
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -1.97
(8.31)
-1.58
(7.69)
16.33*
(4.62)
Year .30*
(.11)
.32*
(.13)
.43*
(.14)
Policy Preferencest-1 2.99*
(.45)
3.28*
(.80)
3.72*
(.63)
Policy Preferencest-1 ¥ Liberal Democracy -2.76*
(.59)
-2.93*
(.66)
-2.72*
(.66)
Institutional Veto Points -.36
(.50)
-.27
(.49)
.24
(.52)
Unemployment -.49*
(.25)
-.47*
(.23)
—
Per Capita GDP -.42
(.26)
-.49
(.27)
-.81*
(.24)
Aged Population .67*
(.22)
.64*
(.22)
—
Women’s Labor Force Participationt-1 .24*
(.06)
.27*
(.08)
.25*
(.06)
Left Party Control .01
(.01)
—
b -.01
(.01)
Cumulative Left Party Control —
b -.02
(.07)
—
b
Religious Party Control .09*
(.02)
.09*
(.02)
.06*
(.02)
Direct Investment Outﬂows .37
(.36)
.41
(.32)
.80*
(.22)
R
2 .94 .94 .89
a. Coefﬁcients estimated by OLS with robust-cluster standard errors; an asterisk next to a coefﬁcient denotes signiﬁcance at the .05 level.
b. Contemporaneous and cumulative left party control not estimated in the same model.
822 clem brooks and jeff manzaerences, we present in Model 2 an alternative speciﬁ-
cation that replaces the (contemporaneous) left party
governance covariate with a cumulative left gover-
nance measure. As displayed in the second column of
Table 1, inclusion of this measure increases the mag-
nitude of the policy preference coefﬁcients.
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Turning to our analysis of sources of welfare
state persistence, we focus on three sets of countries
(Norway, Germany/Italy and Australia/United
Kingdom/United States) during the time period from
1991 to 1997. These countries exemplify the social
democratic, Christian democratic, and liberal welfare
state type,and we have full information in the data set
forallsixcountriesin1991and1997.Theﬁrstpanelin
Figure 2 summarizes results for Norway. The baseline
estimates are obtained by using no hypothetical
manipulation in covariate levels, and they reveal a 1
percentage point increase in the Norwegian welfare
state.
12 In scenario 2,we simulate the effect of a move-
ment toward U.S. demographic composition, where
Norway attains by 1997 the American level of aged
population and women’s labor force participation—
this results in a net reduction of 2 percentage points in
welfare effort, suggesting the importance of these
factors. But results for scenario 3 are even more dra-
matic: simulating the U.S. level of policy preferences
leads to a very large (14 percentage point) net decline
in Norwegian welfare effort in the 1990s,resulting in a
retrenchment scenario. This suggests the importance
of (high) levels of policy preferences to maintenance
of the Norwegian welfare state.
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In Figure 2’s second panel,the baseline prediction
for the combined cases of Germany and Italy show a 2
percentage point increase in welfare effort from 1991
to 1997. In scenario 2’s estimate, welfare state effort
increases by an additional 2 percentage points,and this
is because women’s labor force participation in
Germany and Italy is much lower than in the United
States.In scenario 3,a movement toward the U.S.level 11Using Model 3, we consider a ﬁnal scenario, namely, that trends
in welfare state output are linked to distributional changes involv-
ing unemployment and the age structure of the population.Delet-
ing the unemployment and aged population variables from the
model yields a larger year coefﬁcient (.43 in Model 3 versus .30 in
Model 1), consistent with this hypothesis. But with respect to our
primary focus on mass policy preferences, exclusion of the unem-
ployment and aged population effects yields larger policy prefer-
ence coefﬁcients, and we again rely on the more conservative
estimates obtained from Model 1.
12For these analyses, we use Norway as an exemplar of the social
democratic regime type since the OECD/ISSP data set contains
data on Sweden only in 1997.
13We performed calculations for all remaining independent vari-
ables, ﬁnding that simulating the 1997 U.S. level of mass policy
preferences had the largest impact on Norwegian welfare state
spending.
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why do welfare states persist? 823of policy preferences results in a 10 percentage point
net drop in welfare effort in Germany and Italy, a
forecast similar to the earlier calculations for Norway.
Theseresultssuggesttheimportanceof recentlevelsof
policy preferences to persistence in the Christian
democratic welfare state.
Results for the liberal democracies of Australia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States are pre-
sented in Figure 2’s third panel. The baseline predic-
tion is a modest increase in spending between 1991
and 1997.The second scenario leaves the baseline pre-
diction unchanged because of similarity in levels of
demographic composition across these countries. But
scenario 3’s assumption of the U.S. level of policy
preferences also has no effect on the baseline predic-
tion. This result is attributable not only to similarity
in policy preferences within these countries, but also
because the linkage between policy preferences and
welfare states is lower within liberal democracies.
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Note that if we recalculate scenarios 1 and 3 to focus
solely on Australia and the United Kingdom (thus
ignoring the U.S.case),we obtain similar results:base-
line estimates are 20% in 1991 and 22% in 1997, and
estimates for scenario 3 leave the baseline trend
unchanged.
Taken in summary, then, these simulations of
negative pressures enable us to gauge the importance
of demographic composition and policy preferences
as sources of welfare state persistence. We can see in
the Norwegian and German/Italian cases how, absent
current levels of demographic composition and espe-
cially policy preferences, a pattern of persistence
during the 1990s would likely have devolved into
welfare state retrenchment. These results bear on
questions about sources of persistence. We discuss
implications below.
Discussion
Questions about the developmental trajectory of the
welfare state—and the possibility of retrenchment—
have been central in recent comparative politics and
political-sociological scholarship. An accumulating
body of evidence has challenged once-common fore-
casts of the inevitability of welfare state decline
(Pierson 2001; Stephens 1996; Swank 2002), pointing
to restructuring and a medley of policy-speciﬁc
trends. The limitations of the retrenchment scenario
for capturing the complexity of current developmen-
tal patterns have raised important new questions
concerning sources of persistence tendencies in the
size and aggregate output of welfare states (Esping-
Andersen 1996, 267).
This study has sought to consider mass policy
preferences as one source of aggregate persistence ten-
dencies within welfare states. We have employed a
comparative research design in which measurement of
variables are standardized across countries and over
time to examine the impact of mass policy prefer-
ences. Our measure of overall welfare state effort
(which includes both cash beneﬁts and social services
spending relative to GDP) does not exhaust the pos-
sibilities for examining this question. But it provides a
useful connection to previous literature and one basis
for considering factors behind persistence tendencies
in the aggregate output of welfare states.
15
Our multivariate analyses have taken into
account established factors of welfare state develop-
ment, while also addressing the possibility of endo-
geneity with respect to the linkage between policy
preferences and welfare state output. Explicit tests for
endogeneity set a high standard for inference, but
there remain other puzzles regarding long-term feed-
back processes that we have not explored in this
paper. We emphasize that the current study is prop-
erly viewed as providing an initial set of baseline esti-
mates for subsequent research and debate, not as the
ﬁnal word on sources of persistence.
Ourprogrammaticﬁndingconcernsthecentrality
of mass policy preferences to persistence in welfare
states during the 1990s. We presented a set of simula-
tions that suggest the magnitude of the temporal
impact of mass policy preferences. In the Norwegian
case, the signiﬁcance of high levels of welfare state
preferencesforunderstandingwelfarestatepersistence
can be seen through our simulation of a trend toward
the lower levels of preferences found in the United
States. In reducing welfare state spending by 15 per-
centage points from the baseline estimate, our results
suggest how the Norwegian welfare state would likely
have fared absent the temporal pattern of policy pref-
erences during the 1990s. Similar results are found for
theGermanandItalianwelfarestate,wheresimulating
14This can be seen by simulating (higher) welfare state responsive-
ness in social/Christian democracies (b = 2.99 from Table 1),
yieldingamoresizable5%declineinwelfarestateoutputinliberal
democracies.
15We emphasize again that the policy outputs of welfare states have
been subject to heterogeneous and at times divergent trends. Our
focus here has been on one measure of the aggregate outputs of
welfare states, leaving open questions concerning the impact of
mass policy preferences within speciﬁc social policy domains.
824clem brooks and jeff manzaa movement toward the (lower) level of U.S. policy
preferences results in a comparably large net decline
between 1991 and 1997.
Where policy preferences appear critical to the
maintenance of welfare states within these national
contexts, our analyses yield quite different results for
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Because our multivariate analyses provide evi-
dence that the linkage between policy preferences
and welfare output is fairly weak within liberal
democracies, parallel simulations involving historical
shifts in the level of preferences have a modest
impact on liberal welfare states. As a factor behind
welfare state persistence, mass policy preferences
appear of greatest signiﬁcance within the European
social and Christian democracies, where levels of
welfare state support have frequently been quite high
and enduring.
The results of this study suggest the possibility of
fruitful synthesis between existing welfare state theo-
ries and the newer policy responsiveness literatures.
Mass policy preferences ﬁt well within both power
resources and path dependency theories, and the
results presented here suggest they contribute to the
institutionalization of social policy frameworks
within speciﬁc national settings. The temporal effects
of aggregate preferences on welfare state persistence
also have implications for considering mechanisms
through which path dependency operates. Indeed, an
important reason why political ofﬁcials may have
greater incentive to maintain (or extend) entitlement
programs stems from their enduring degree of popu-
larity within many polities. In this way, then, recent
patterns of welfare state “locking in” operate not
only through well-known mechanisms such as con-
stitutional structure, but also through mass policy
preferences. Results of this study suggest the utility of
considering the policy preferences of national popu-
lations as part of an explanation for the resiliency of
welfare states.
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